A recent approach based on Bayesian inverse planning for the "theory of mind" has shown good performance in modeling human cognition. However, perfect inverse planning differs from human cognition during one kind of complex tasks due to human bounded rationality. One example is an environment in which there are many available plans for achieving a specific goal. We propose a "plan predictability oriented model" as a model of inferring other peoples' goals in complex environments. This model adds the bias that people prefer predictable plans. This bias is calculated with simple plan prediction. We tested this model with a behavioral experiment in which humans observed the partial path of goal-directed actions. Our model had a higher correlation with human inference. We also confirmed the robustness of our model with complex tasks and determined that it can be improved by taking account of individual differences in "bounded rationality".
Introduction
People have a cognitive mechanism called the "theory of mind" that can estimate peoples purposes and plans through observation from infancy (Woodward, Sommerville, & Guajardo, 2001 ). Trials for using this theory of mind as a computational model are of great interest in the cognitive science arena, and there has been a lot of research about this (Goldman, 2012) (Paul & Cassimatis, 2006) .
A recent approach based on Bayesian inverse planning has been recognized as a method for modeling the theory of mind (Baker, Saxe, & Tenenbaum, 2009) . In this approach, people are modeled as agents who are rational (Dennett, 1987) . When a goal is given, rational agents behave rationally to achieve it. The posterior probability of a particular goal given observed behavior is calculated by the product of the prior probability of the goal and the likely behavior of the rational agent given the goal.
This approach can be applied to all problems in which rational agents can be designed. There are many examples of functions used to estimate other peoples' intentions on the basis of this approach, such as other peoples' intermediate goals (Nakahashi, Baker, & Tenenbaum, 2016) , preferences toward navigation (Jara-ettinger, Schulz, & Tenenbaum, 2014) , and so on.
However, this approach may differ from human perception in some complex situations. Figure 1 is one example of such a problem. In Figure 1 (a), the robot wants to open and go through one of the doors. It wants to go through either the orange door or the green door, and the doors require a key of the same color to be opened. To open a door, the robot assembles the required key. To do so, it is necessary to collect three types of parts as shown in Figure  1 (c). In 1 (a), the robot moved as indicated by the purple line. Which door is the robot about to open, the orange or the green one? In this case, many people will answer with the green one. This is because, if the robot wanted to open the orange door, it would collect the three parts shown on the upper half and open the orange door. How about the example in 1 (b)? Perfectly rational thought leads to the conclusion that the correct answer is green, as in 1 (a). The reason is that there is a shorter path to collect the orange key parts than the current robot path. For this reason, the inference formed on the basis of the Bayesian inverse planning model will be that the robot wants to go through the green door in this example. However, we often infer that the robot wants to go through the orange door when looking at Figure 1 (b) .
This difference is due to the fact that observers cannot completely recognize the rationality of the actors when a problem is complicated. In the above example, there are many possible plans to achieve one goal, but it is difficult to evaluate all of them. On the basis of this reason, human inference is affected by the bias towards "easy to predict" plans. This means that humans only consider a few plans that can be easily predicted. This is an example of bounded rationality (Simon, 1957) .
In this paper, we propose a novel model called the "plan predictability oriented model" for modeling human inference with plan predictability bias. We aim to build a more adequate model of human inference in problem settings in which there are many plans available to achieve one goal, as shown in the example. This model is based on Bayesian inverse planning, but we allowed for bias in plan predictability in the inference phase. We perform calculation with the likelihood of a future plan from observed behavior like plan prediction (Charniak & Goldman, 1993) , and we use the likelihood as our plan predictability bias. We use simple soft-max likelihood base plan prediction.
To show the advantages of our proposed model, we designed a scenario called "item creating" and carried out subject experiments with it. In this scenario, there is an agent that collects parts to create a specific item. Participants observe part of the behavior of the agent and are then asked to estimate the item that the agent wants to create on the basis of the observation. We compared the correlation between this participants data and both the inferences formed on the basis of the full inverse planning model and our model. The result was that our model had a better correlation with human inference than did the full inverse planning model. Additionally, we confirmed that a higher task complexity made the accuracy of the full inverse planning model worse, but our model was not affected. We also show that there are individual differences regarding the bias and that we can improve our model by considering individual differences.
We wrote a problem setting, detailed the full inverse planning model and plan predictability oriented model, wrote the details and results of evaluations with the "item creating" scenario, discussed and summarized our approach.
Computational Model Preliminary Notation and Problem Setting
We denote the set of people's goals as G and the set of actions as A. Action sequences are represented as a ∈ A + , and the set of all plans to achieve goal g ∈ G are represented as P g . Since plans are a kind of sequence, P g ⊂ A + .
Model of Human Rationality
We use Boltzmann noisy rationality as the rationality of action for our model. In the definition for Boltzmann noisy rationality, P(a|g) is the probability that an agent executes a for g in accordance with the Boltzmann distribution of the "value" of a for achieving g. Equation 1 is the definition of the probability. β is the temperature parameter of the Boltzmann distribution to define rationality.
Here, Q g (a) corresponds to the value function in terms of MDP planning or reinforcement learning which means expected rewards after executing a under g.
Modeling and Calculation

Problem Objective
The objective of our modeling is the posterior probability that the goal of others is g when observing others action sequence a.
Calculating Full Inverse Planning Model In the inverse planning approach, we reverse the variable dependency in Eq. 2 by using a Bayesian theorem.
We assume no prior knowledge about another persons goal. In other words, we assume P(g) as a uniform distribution. Therefore, we can ignore P(g) from Eq. 3. To calculate this, we assume that a human creates a plan in advance and executes their actions according to the plan. Thus, we can factorize P(a|g) into the probability of a plan to be considered as one achieving g and the probability of executing a under the plan. The following equation is obtained when summarizing this factored probability for all available plans.
P(a|p) and P(p|g) are calculated using Boltzmann noisy rationality.
Note, that p is a plan for achieving a specific goal. In other words, if a plan decided, the corresponding goal also comes uniquely. Thus we can treat Q p,g (a) as Q p (a)
Calculating Plan Predictability Oriented Model In the plan predictability oriented model, Eq. 3 is the same; however, the way of calculating of P(a|g) is made different in order to integrate the bias that people prefer predicable plans. The predictability of a plan is the probability that a plan is executing from observing action sequences, thus that is p(p|a).
We use this instead of P(a|p); thus, we obtain the following equation. Here, we use simple Boltzmann noisy rationality for P(p|a) as follows.
Comparison of Full Inverse Planning Model and Plan Predictability Oriented Model Figure 2 shows the difference in graphical models for P(g|a). As shown Figure 2 (a), in the full inverse planning model, humans assume that others decide their plan in advance and then act according to it. This is the natural process of human planning. In comparison, as Figure 2 (b), in the plan predictability oriented model, action sequence affect plans. This means that humans may change their plans depending on their actions, and this is unintuitive. We assume that humans cannot calculate the goals of others on the basis of full inverse planning model because the model needs all plans of P g , and this is almost impossible for humans in complex situations. Humans consider several plans to estimate others' goal and they tend to consider plans that they can predict easily. This is the reason that humans tend to think that others take actions according to such unintuitive process and this is plan predictability bias.
Discussion
Essentially, full inverse planning model differs from human cognition in situations in which there is a difference in the rationality of the actor and the observer. Since forward planning for taking action towards a particular goal is generally easier than inverse planning to infer cause from actions observed, these situations might always happen. Therefore, we think that the model is useful for many situations. In addition, our computational model is based on the inverse planning model and simple plan prediction, so it has the potential of being adapted to various situations. However, we showed the actual effectiveness only under the "item creating" scenario. This scenario is one example environment that has a grid geometric rationality and sequential planning. Explicit sequential planning is the most basic planning, and a lot of human planning is based on sequential planning. The grid geometric rationality and sequential planning are often used in the theory of mind (Baker, Jara-Ettinger, Saxe, & Tenenbaum, 2017) . Therefore, we think that our model can be used in broad situations. Understanding how humans infer others' intentions is useful for considering good actions when corroborating with others. In the cognitive science area, there is research on how humans behave when they want to communicate their goal or purpose (Shafto, Goodman, & Griffiths, 2014) . In the artificial intelligence and robotics areas, research on collaborative planning is more popular and important. For example,"legibility" is proposed (Dragan & Srinivasa, 2014) . This is a measure of human expectation toward robots' intentions or goals as based on the behavior of robots. There are also works on using "legibility" for planning (Fisac et al., 2017) .
The expansion of our model for larger and more complex tasks is a very interesting direction for our future work. Introducing hierarchical planning is a promising approach. Our model can be considered as one type of hierarchical modeling in which the inference of plans is regarded as an intermediate layer. The hierarchical predictive coding framework (Blokpoel, Kwisthout, & van Rooij, 2012 ) is one example of hierarchical modeling for human cognition. This model has multiple inference layers with different abstraction levels, and execute step-by-step inference by using MAP estimation. Similarly, our model can be expanded with multiple planning layers. Determining whether such a model is better for modeling human cognition would be an interesting next research step.
Deeper analysis of individual rationality is also interesting. We just demonstrated that human rationality differs from person to person. However, there might be some factors that decide the degree of bias. Seeking such factors and improving our model by implementing them would be a valuable study.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a novel computational model called the "plan predictability oriented model" to infer the goals of others through their behavior. This model implements bounded rationality for complex tasks that have many options for one purpose. We confirmed that our model has a better correlation with human inference than the full inverse planning model via a subject experiment using the item creating scenario. We also confirmed that the full inverse planning model becomes progressively worse with the increasing complexity of tasks, while our model remains unaffected by changes in complexity. This suggests that our model has robustness for complex tasks. We also confirmed the existence of individual differences in bounded rationality and suggested that we could improve our model by introducing individualized bounded rationality.
Although there are many limitations and much room for improvement, the model is valuable as one example of the theory of mind with bounded rationality. We are confident that this result can contribute to research on human cognition and the development of engineering applications under cognitive science.
